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Picking Up the Law
PHYLLIS GOLDFARB*

I.

QUESTIONS

The Pierre Schlag immersion course inspired by this symposium
has been absorbing, unsettling, and invigorating. One need not have
dipped too deeply into the Schlag oeuvre to realize that to the extent
critique is an art form, Pierre is a great master.' This mastery is apparent whether one identifies with the author or with his targets. 2 Even the
discomfort of seeing myself at times among the latter did not diminish
my capacity to marvel at Pierre's clear-eyed and withering intellectual
satire of the ideological and aesthetic practices of legal academia.3 Yet
despite the clarity of his writing, or perhaps because of it, Pierre's work
spawns a host of questions. I pose a few of them here.
Pierre does a brilliant, indeed hilarious, sendup of the compulsive
repetition of the "What Should We Do?" question in the law school
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. I am grateful to Maria Grahn-Farley,
Anthony Farley, Evangeline Sarda, and Catherine Wells for their support and assistance while I
was writing this article. I am also grateful to Irene Good, Lou Dundin, and Cindy Robinson for
their research efforts, to Donna Gattoni and Theresa Kachmar for their administrative assistance,
and to Boston College Law School for its research support. I am indebted to Michael Fischl at
University of Miami School of Law for organizing this symposium and inviting me to participate.
I extend gratitude as well to the participants in the symposium for their engagement in these ideas,
and to Pierre Schlag and Jack Schlegel for communications even after the symposium had
concluded.
1. While it praises Pierre's achievements, the term "great master" has a double edge in this
context. Some critical thinkers are likely to understand the process of anointing great masters as
an illegitimate use of authority and the category itself as a race-specific and gender-specific
designation. Questions about how to view Pierre's work through the lens of race and gender were
raised during the February symposium. Some of these questions are explored in Joanne
Conaghan, Schlag in Wonderland, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 543 (2003).
2. Of course, defensive and unreflective emotional states generated by identification with
targets of the critique can obscure recognition of this mastery. For psychological insight into
distress reactions such as these, see Peter Goodrich, Pierre the Anomalist: An Epistemology of the
Legal Closet, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 791 (2003).

3. His satirical tone and trenchant analysis are displayed abundantly in

PIERRE SCHLAG,

(1996)
[hereinafter LAYING DOWN THE LAW] and PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON (1998)
[hereinafter ENCHANTMENT]. For a glimpse of his biting humor, see Schlag's Top Ten charts on
the normative articles of the eighties containing only five entries, including Have a Nice (Really
Elegant and Totally Abstract) Day, We Should Talk and Talk and Talk About Talk and Just Keep
on Talking, and The Zeitgeist is Going My Way. LAYING DOWN THE LAW, supra, at 19-26. For
Schlag's reasoned argument against the possibility of reason as the medium for law, see generally
ENCHANTMENT, supra. For Schlag's elaboration of the implications of law as an aesthetic
LAYING DOWN THE LAW:

MYSTICISM,

FETISHISM,

AND THE AMERICAN

LEGAL MIND

practice, see Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. L.

REV.

1047 (2002).
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context, 4 a question that he views as derived from the law professor's
misplaced yet routine identification with the figure of the judge.5 Nevertheless, many of the writings prepared for this symposium posed some
version of that question and some modest replies to it.6 Jack Schlegel
asks the question directly, albeit facetiously, in the title of his paper.7
Too intimidated by Pierre's critique to ask the question directly, even in
a facetious way, I ask it in a disguised way, although I think that my
variants on the question may be different enough from "What should we
do?" to be better questions. 8
4. See, e.g., LAYING DOWN THE LAW, supra note 3, at 17-36. Here is an excerpt:
["What should we do?"] is an interruption posing as an origin. It poses as an origin
in that it takes itself to be the original motivation for engaging in legal thought. And
yet here, the "What should we do?" interrupts the process of trying to understand
what enterprise we, as legal thinkers, are already engaged in. It interrupts the
process of attempting to reveal the character of our disciplines and our practices as
legal thinkers....
In fact, normative legal thought is so much in a hurry that it will tell you what
to do even though there is not the slightest chance that you might actually be in a
position to do it.
Id. at 27-28.
5. [l]t is the self-identification with the figure of the judge that establishes the
pathways, limits, concerns, procedures, and preoccupations of American legal
thinkers.
Id. at 135.
[T]his self-identification with the subject-formation of the judge establishes a set of
intellectual tasks for legal academics-namely, the tracing of law back through its
authoritative materials, the policing and normalization of new forms of legal
thought, the recognition and conceptualization of new juridical problems, the
expulsion of spurious or subversive jurisprudential tendencies, and the perfection
and general improvement of existing formulations of law.
Id. at 137.
But even as the self-identification of legal thinkers with the figure of the judge is
becoming increasingly strained and increasingly improbable, legal thinkers are still
living its history. The self-identification survives at an abstract, but nonetheless
foundational, level. It survives as an aesthetic, in the fundamental ontological forms
and in the pervasive normative orientation of American legal thought.
Id. at 138.
To be self-identified with the subject formation of the judge is thus to be
intellectually compromised. It is to be beholden to a rhetoric, an aesthetic, and
normative commitments that are pervasively anti-intellectual-that are, in fact,
destructive of intellectual endeavor.
Id. at 145.
6. See, e.g., Jeremy Paul, Beyond Reason and Interest, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 593 (2003);
John Henry Schlegel, But Pierre, If We Can't Think Normatively, What Are We to Do?, 57 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 955 (2003); David A. Westbrook, Pierre Schlag and the Temple of Boredom, 57
U. MIAMI L. REV. 649 (2003).
7. See Schlegel, supra note 6.
8. It is intimidating to offer tentative reactions, from the standpoint of clinical legal
education or any other, to fully conceived intellectual achievements like The Enchantment of
Reason. Although I thought I trusted my reactions, I also feared that Pierre would be several
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Among the questions that Pierre's work raises for me are these:
"Where can someone persuaded, at least in part, by Pierre's decimation

of the dominant work of the law school 9 continue to stand within it?"
This is not a variation of Paul Carrington's assertion in the mid-eighties

that critics have an obligation to resign from law teaching."0 It is an
attempt to address the intractable dilemma of how to live life in accord
with your insights, which is exceedingly difficult when you work within
a framework built on denying those insights.'"
Other ways to frame the question are: "Within Pierre's critique, is
there such a thing as an authentic law professor?" "Does his work admit
of the possibility of achieving something resembling respectability as a
legal academic?" Or, stated differently, "Where within a law school can
a postmodern legal critic stand?"
For the duration of this essay, I adopt the positioning question,
"Where Can One Stand?" as an alternative to "What Should We Do?"
The question is compelling to me for this reason: While I have a sense of

Pierre as a scholar, I have no sense of Pierre as a teacher. As I read his
prolific outpourings, I kept trying to imagine him in his day-to-day role
as a teacher. Who is Pierre Schlag as a teacher? What is the content and
method of his classroom? Has he developed a counterpedagogy? What
do his students learn? Are there ways of approaching the subject idenmoves ahead of me, seeing the rhetorical devices and intellectual strategies that I could not see
deployed in my own writing, as he has honed this talent to an extraordinary degree. While I
typically resist the confessional mode, I am reporting this experience because I think Pierre's
writing would be more widely appreciated if readers were more aware of the psychological impact
that his work had on them. Despite the complexities embedded in the law review convention of
excessive footnoting, it has created an easy way for me to offer this commentary.
9. According to Pierre, the dominant work of the law school is the proliferation of normative
legal thought. See LAYING DOWN THE LAW, supra note 3.
10. See Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEOAL EOuC. 222, 226-27 (1984).
11.One of Pierre's numerous accounts of the phenomenon of denial within legal academia is
as follows:
The problem for legal thinkers is that the normative appeal of normative legal
thought systematically turns attention away from recognizing that normative legal
thought is grounded on an utterly unbelievable re-presentation of the field it claims
to describe and regulate. The problem is that normative legal thought, rather than
assisting in the understanding of present political and moral situations, stands in the
way. It systematically reinscribes its own aesthetic-its own fantastic
understanding of the political and moral scene.
Until normative legal thought begins to deal with its own paradoxical
postmodern rhetorical situation, it will remain something of an irresponsible
enterprise.
LAYING DOWN THE LAW, supra note 3, at 37-38. For another account of denial, see Pierre Schlag,
Hiding the Ball, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1681, 1695 (1996) [hereinafter Hiding the Ball] ("American
law is organized to shuttle doubts and challenges away from the ontology of law, preferably to
technical questions, very often to normative ones, if necessary to epistemic inquiries, but always
away from ontological inquiry.").
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tity of the law teacher that are less tarnished by his critique than is the

caricature of the typical law professor in the classroom who at various
times shows up in Pierre's descriptions of anti-intellectual academic
life? 2 As a law professor, is it possible to ask directly of those who
have come to pick up the law whether it isn't better, for example, to lay
it down? 13 If it is, and if he does, how does that conversation sound?
II.

THIS COULD BE YOUR CLINIC

I want to suggest a possible location for a law professor who, with
Pierre's help, has become at least sufficiently dispossessed of the
enchantment of reason to wrestle with these questions. 4 Considering
this location requires imagining into existence a Pierre Schlag
Postmodern Legal Clinic and asking whether the thought experiment
produces anything intelligible.' 5 To lend more particularity to these
imaginings, try to conjure up a criminal defense program within this
clinic, where the professor engages with students about their work representing indigent clients facing misdemeanor charges in the local criminal court. Other than for crassly self-serving reasons, (i.e., I am quite
familiar with such a setting),' 6 I have chosen this outpost 7 for discussion purposes in this essay in part for the reason I chose it for my work,
that is, because it largely elides the question whether to affirmatively
12. For one example, see Hiding the Ball, supra note 11, at 1683-85.
13. Laying down the law, with its ironic double meaning, is the possibility Pierre raises in the
final paragraph of Laying Down the Law as an alternative to celebrating, expanding, and
worshiping law. See LAYING DOWN THE LAW, supra note 3, at 166.
14. The enchantment of reason refers to the pervasive tendency of American legal thinkers to
deny that reason, the perceived medium through which law operates, rests on precarious grounds
and is thus another form of belief. The Enchantment of Reason elegantly elaborates this argument
and its implications. See ENCHANTMENT, supra note 3.
15. Pierre has not previously sought to develop an account of a postmodem legal clinic, nor is
it clear that he would welcome such an endeavor. He has, however, sought to account for the
clinic's marginalization in legal education as a material reflection of the internal/external (read:
privileged/unprivileged) dichotomy that pervades American legal thought. See Pierre Schlag,
Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801 (1991) [hereinafter Normativity].
16. Familiarity is both a benefit and a drawback. While it provides experiential grounds for
filling in the details of this thought experiment, it also raises greater possibilities for self-delusion.
In Pierre's words: "[tIt is to be expected that any participant's perspective on his own practice will
include the rhetorical means for the self-preservation of the practice." LAYING DOWN THE LAW,
supra note 3, at 135. Alternatively, "[lIt is less than pleasant to actually consider the emptiness of
a discipline when it is one's own." ENCHANTMENT, supra note 3, at 10. I leave for others to
evaluate whether the risks Pierre cites are realized in this essay.
17. 1 deliberately chose the term "outpost" to invoke resonances of the colonial character of
American criminal justice. For fuller development of the colonial resonances in American
criminal justice, see James M. Doyle, "It's the Third World Down There!" The Colonialist
Vocation and American Criminal Justice, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 71 (1992), and James M.
Doyle, Into the Eight Ball: The Colonialists' Landscape in American Criminal Justice, 12 B.C.
THIRD WORLD L.J. 65 (1992).
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choose the law as a path to progressive .change. When the criminal justice bureaucracy is poised to run over your client, the criminal defense
lawyer's choice to use law is not a choice to embrace law but to wield it

defensively in light of the other options.
Here is an account of a Pierre Schlag Postmodern Legal Clinic, the

plausibility of which I throw open for consideration.' 8 The first noteworthy feature of the clinic is that a student who stands with a client in
criminal court is no longer placed in the subject position of the judge.
Already this disrupts Pierre's account of conventional legal education. 9
Rather, the student's identification is with the lawyer, a spot from which
she may also identify or connect with, or at least relate to, the client.

Joanne Conaghan observed that nothing nasty or horrid ever happens to anyone in Pierre's books.2 0 This would not be true in Pierre's
clinic. In a criminal case, nasty and horrid things have likely already
occurred, and clinical pedagogy involves encountering it. Clients in
criminal cases often report experiences that enlarge the students' frames
of reference if only because they provide data that the law school curriculum might otherwise avoid or suppress. In and of itself, this possibility
may facilitate critique.2 ' Instead of focusing on what Pierre calls law's

"unthought," the unexamined belief of legal thinkers and actors that law
operates through the idiom of reason, 22 the clinic would shift the focus
to law's "unthought of," the dispossessed,2 3 the people whose oppres-

sion Conaghan feared was being further marginalized in Pierre's work.24
This alone is a destabilizing and potentially critique-engendering shift,
because excluding the "unthought of' is an important part of law's

"unthought.

25

18. In prior articles, I have tried to develop the intersections between clinical education and
other jurisprudential movements in legal education. See, e.g., Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice
Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and Clinical Education, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1599 (1991)
[hereinafter A Theory-Practice Spiral]; Phyllis Goldfarb, Beyond Cut Flowers: Developing a
Clinical Perspective on CriticalLegal Theory, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 717 (1992) [hereinafter Clinical
This essay, in beginning to develop the possible intersections between
Perspective].
postmodernism and clinical education, extends the series.
19. Pierre acknowledges that the formative identification of the legal thinker with the judgean identification which law professors instill in students-can break down to some extent among
practicing lawyers. See LAYING DOWN THE LAW, supra note 3, at 155. He does not discuss how
the identification with the judge disintegrates among lawyers, what its consequences are, or what
takes its place.
20. See Conaghan, supra note 1,at 547.
21. For a description of critique as an aspirational methodology of clinical education, see A
Theory-Practice Spiral, supra note 18, at 1657-62.
22. See ENCHANTMENT, supra note 3, at 23.
23. See A Theory-PracticeSpiral, supra note 18, at 1686; see also ClinicalPerspective, supra
note 18, at 744.
24. See Conaghan, supra note 1,at 558-69.
25. Otherwise, the systemic race and class hatred that seems to undergird the outcomes of
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In a clinic, the student-attorney is asked to critically reflect on the
experiences of performing her role.2 6 While reasoning through and talking about doctrine may represent an aspect of these experiences, it is an
aspect that is likely to recede vastly in importance as the student
accesses law through the complex, multidimensional interactions of
bureaucratic imperatives, interpersonal dealings, informal processes,
power relations, and so forth, all experienced as impressions, sensations,
feelings, intuitions, and actions.27 This is not the pedagogy skewered by
Pierre's critique."
To understand the assortment of phenomena that arise in a clinic,
the student must focus intensely and purposefully on the meaning and
consequences of her behavior and the behavior of others.2 9 To make
sense of these experiences, the clinic student may need to sort out in a
nuanced way how the bureaucratic culture of the court deploys law and
power and violence." In other words, making sense of these experiences would seem to require critique of conventional legal culture. 3 ' In
many instances, reason can be observed to have played a limited role in
the processing of the case. The robust immediacy of such experiences
criminal cases would undermine the belief that reason is the medium through which law operates.
For an examination of the operation of inequality-particularly race and class inequalitythrough the administration of criminal law, see generally DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE
AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999).

While Pierre focuses on how

law is constructed to repress its pervasive violence, see, e.g., LAYING DOWN THE LAW, supra note
3, at 143-49, David Cole, among others, identifies more specifically those to whom that violence
is directed. The failure to identify the beneficiaries and the objects of law's bureaucratic violence
is a concern raised about Pierre's writing from a feminist/critical race perspective. See, e.g.,
Maria Grahn-Farley, An Open Letter to Pierre Schlag, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 755 (2003).
26. This is the substance of the clinical method of learning from experience. See A TheoryPractice Spiral, supra note 18, at 1647-54.
27. Id. at 1652 ("As an epistemological matter, a broader and deeper sort of comprehension
may follow from integrating knowledge which has been absorbed not just through cognition, but
through a jumble of impressions, sensations, feelings, intuitions, and actions, that are accessible at
various levels of awareness."); Normnativity, supra note 15, at 876 ("[ln law practice, . . . the
political, the social, the psychological, the rhetorical, and the rational are all differentially related
in complex ways.").
28. See, e.g., Hiding the Ball, supra note 11,for an account of traditional classroom
pedagogy. Pierre analyzes the political imperatives that relegate the clinic to a cognitive and
physical area outside the classroom. See Normativity, supra note 15, at 927.
29. See A Theory-Practice Spiral, supra note 18, at 1663:
To say that making students responsible is the best way to make them responsible is
not the simple tautology that it appears. It means that actively taking responsibility
contributes to the development of responsible character . . . [in part because it]
engages a person at a more intense, purposeful, and consequential level.
30. Robert Cover famously confronted us with the awareness that law occurred on a field of
pain and death. See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986).
31. Law school clinics are well-positioned to facilitate such critique. See A Theory-Practice
Spiral, supra note 18, at 1656 ("Supplementing traditional law school education by embedding
law in its context, clinics have the potential to transform the study of law into the study of a
culture that deploys law for various purposes.").
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may well be a route to exposing through teaching, not through scholarship, what Pierre calls "the Noble Scam" for the flimsy account of law
that it is, 32 raising the possibility that the lessons of The Enchantment of
Reason may be internalized far more vividly when they are constructed
empirically and experientially.
When conscientiously undertaken, this critical clinical process
holds promise of revealing the assumptions, biases, and values that are

reflected every day in criminal court. For a Schlagian, this shift in context from law professor's law to an encounter with bureaucratic legal
culture is an encouraging one,33 potentially illuminating the disparity
between the legal theories that the criminal law doctrine espouses and
those that the criminal court expresses.34 This shift in context also

enhances the prospects for law professors to do something more than
what Pierre, in his inimitable style, terms "thug-training. 3 5
Let me give some examples of how a clinic might advance Pierre's
insights through a teaching method. When released from the controlling
grip of law professor's law, the legitimation that can come from the
appearance of employing reason by applying doctrine through a legal
ritual to a person charged with a crime 36 is far less effective when the
32. From within the Noble Scam, law is the application of reason to legal artifacts (that
themselves manifest reason) to produce proper outcomes. See ENCHANTMENT, supra note 3, at 3439.
33. According to Pierre, law manifests a bureaucratic logic, and "practicing lawyers
experience law as a complex network of bureaucratic power arrangements that they have learned
to manipulate." Normativity, supra note 15, at 804. The only thinkable legal thoughts, Pierre
observes, are those that conform to a narrow aesthetic whose boundaries are dictated by the need
to mask the violence inflicted by legal bureaucracies. See, e.g., LAYING DOWN THE LAW, supra
note 3, at 155-59. Alternatively, "the primary role played by normative legal thought is to
constitute students ... as polite, well-mannered vehicles for the polite transaction of bureaucratic
business." Normativity, supra note 15, at 866. In other words, they are taught to speak "niceness
to power." LAYING DOWN THE LAW, supra note 3, at 6.
34. Pierre has observed that "the passionate normative life of the law has no readily apparent
relation to the actual structure or content of legal practice." Normativity, supra note 15, at 803.
"The incommensurability of normative discourse with bureaucratic practice suggests that the
opportunities for the exercise of any 'authentic,' normatively competent behavior are extremely
restricted within bureaucratic forms of life." Id. at 881. Pierre illuminates these observations
about the separation of normative legal thought from the practice of law through his analysis of a
fictional criminal case that arose when attorney Stuart Markowitz was arrested for driving while
intoxicated, a scenario that appeared on L.A. Law. Id. at 852-84.
35. This is the reason, Pierre asserts, that law professors insist that law is governed by reason:
without reason, law is ritualized violence and they are thug-trainers. See ENCHANTMENT, SUPra
note 3, at 21. The characterization is only slightly less unflattering in Laying Down the Law:
"Legal academics [are] trainers of meta-insurance adjusters." LAYING DOWN THE LAW, supra
note 3, at 38.
36. Understanding the law as coherent and its application as justified is a necessary deceit,
Schlag observes. Otherwise, legal actors would notice the violence of their enterprise and be less
able to function according to law's normative needs. See LAYING DOWN THE LAW, supra note 3,
at 156-59.
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student-attorney, through identification with a client, can see the suffering that the system both ignores and produces.3 7 The student, whose
clinical process urges her to try seeing the world through her client's
eyes,38 may also see that the bureaucratic process does no such thing.39
Rarely will a court expend effort trying to understand the client's life,
and the limited amount of official time devoted to the case exposes this
reality.4 °
37. Consider, for example, the suffering inflicted by forced incarceration, separation of
families, and state killing as responses even to acts that arise, at least in part, from untreated

addictions, undiagnosed mental illnesses, and the corrosive effects of poverty. See also Pierre's
characterizations of criminal law, as depicted in the Markowitz arrest episode of L.A. Law, to be
"sex-hating," "life-denying," "fun-killing," "Orwellian," "unaccountably random," "awesomely
powerful," and "wrong." Normativity, supra note 15, at 853, 857.
38. See, e.g., Stephen Ellmann, The Ethic of Care as an Ethic for Lawyers, 81 GEo. L.J. 2665,

2700 (noting that the caring lawyer should try "to enter her client's world without leaving her
own"); Phyllis Goldfarb, A Clinic Runs Through It, I CLINICAL L. REV. 65, 67 (1994) ("[C]linical
education, through its attention to concrete particularities and the feelings that they evoke,
operates by an inherent narrative method.").
39. According to Edward Dauer and Arthur Leff, bureaucracies treat people "as nonpeople."
See Edward A. Dauer & Arthur Allen Leff, Correspondence: The Lawyer as Friend, 86 Yale L.J.

573, 581 (1977).
40. "Hopelessly awash in a sea of cases, the Court is unable to administer justice.
Recognizing that, it has redefined its mission. The measurement of success is the disposition rate,
how many cases can be moved in and out of the court, without regard to how they are moved."
Harry I. Subin, The New York City Criminal Court: The Case for Abolition, in OCCASIONAL
PAPERS FROM THE CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON CRIME AND JUSTICE 8 (Graham Hughes ed., 1992).
Subin reported that approximately 213,000 cases were processed in the New York City Criminal
Court in 1990 at an average of five minutes for each case. Id. at I. See also OFFICE OF THE
ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE COURTS, THE 1992 REPORT OF THE COURTS OF WASHINGTON 7-8 (1992)
(reporting that lower courts in Washington state disposed of 391,135 cases in 1992); Maureen
Mileski, Courtroom Encounters: An Observation Study of a Lower Criminal Court, 5 LAW &

Soc'Y REV. 473, 479 (1971) (reporting that nearly three-quarters of the cases in one court were
handled in one minute or less).
Public defenders often operate under such staggering caseloads and resource constraints that
individualization of the client's situation is impossible. See, e.g., NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND
DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, INDIGENT DEFENSE CASELOADS AND COMMON SENSE: AN UPDATE 26
(1992) (finding an average annual misdemeanor caseload of 613 cases per attorney); AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS: A REPORT TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND THE
AMERICAN BAR ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES: SOME MYTHS, SOME REALITIES,

AND SOME QUESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 43 (1988) (recommending a caseload of no more than 300
misdemeanors per attorney per year). Caseload volume like this requires triage in representation.
See John B. Mitchell, Redefining the Sixth Amendment, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1215, 1239-48 (1994)
(describing the public defenders' triage process).
Most studies of the criminal court as an organization depict it as a bureaucracy in which
judges, prosecutors, and defenders generally cooperate to process cases, typically involving
underprivileged people, as expeditiously as possible. See, e.g., PETER F. NARDULLI, THE
COURTROOM ELITE; AN ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE

66 (1978). Some

commentators question the necessity of routine nonadversarial processing of so many cases in so
little time. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REV.
1107 (1984) (arguing that within current resource levels, a bench trial system could be substituted
for plea-bargaining).
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On the other hand, if the student has developed a relationship with
the client, the apparent dichotomy offered by conventional criminal law
between guilt and innocence, free will and determinism, may already
have begun to dissolve.4 When confronted with the complexity and

ambiguity of some clients' life circumstances, student attorneys might
come to see that each of these supposedly oppositional terms is not an
uncontestable observation but an ideological choice.4 2 Whether this

realization arrives as a slowly dawning awareness, a postmodern epiphany, or in some other form, the point is that experiencing the system's
contradictions in a broader material sense rather than through an

abstracted form of thinking can create greater space for critical consciousness to emerge.43 The critique is not derived from the operation of

reason, though this may play a role. Rather, it becomes palpable and
visible when it is experienced in the first person, when by virtue of the
assumption of the lawyer's role the student has become implicated in the
system's workings.
The value of being implicated to generate the motivational condi-

tions for critique is something of a paradox. The clinic facilitates critique by enabling broad information gathering and extended empiricism

at the very moment when students are first picking up the law.44
Although students may enter clinics for the purpose of increasing their
comfort level with working in the law, the clinic can cultivate discomfort with law's workings.4 5 This might be the source of the creative

tension that generates the opening for critique. While law students may
41. Pierre observes that these dichotomies are imposed as if they were accurate descriptions
of social reality. This is always a "reductionist enterprise," as the judge "is constantly seeking to
impose the template of the 'law' on situations whose meanings exceed any template." LAYING
DOWN THE LAW, supra note 3, at 155.
42. For a discussion of the notion of individual guilt and innocence as ideological rather than
descriptive, see Richard C. Boldt, Restitution, Criminal Law, and the Ideology of Individuality, 77
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 969 (1986), and Michael Bayles, Character,Purpose, and Criminal
Responsibility, 1 LAW & PHIL. 5 (1982). See also Charles L. Black, Jr., The Crisis in Capital
Punishment, 31 MD. L. REV. 289, 298 (1971):
[W]e are dealing here, in truth, with philosophic issues which philosophy has quite
failed to resolve-issues of determinism, free will, and responsibility. But we are
not debating these issues philosophically. We are putting some humans through
unutterable agony on the basis of a pretense, nothing short of frivolous, that we have
satisfactorily resolved these issues. How can we dare go on doing this?
43. Pierre implies that the student will learn instead to compartmentalize herself as a way of
managing the contradictions that law practice presents. See Normativity, supra note 15, at 928.
This is certainly one way to reduce the obvious dissonance, but critical consciousness of the sort
Pierre has developed is another.
44. See, e.g., Clinical Perspective, supra note 18, at 746 ("Clinical educators encourage and
expect clinical participants, all of whom have access to thick layers of data, to devise multiple
interpretations of multiple phenomena.").
45. See, e.g., A Theory-Practice Spiral, supra note 18, at 1657.
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be learning enchantment with reason in classrooms where, as Pierre
says, the ball is hidden, they cannot easily form professional identities in
the controlled classroom environment.46 Perhaps it is only when students are in the early stages of professional identity formation, when
they are first becoming legal subjects, when they are first picking up the
law, that the meaning and consequences of laying it down, or doing
something else with it, can be meaningfully grasped.4 7 Perhaps the
clinic is a form of concrete political organization of the sort that Jeremy
Paul recommends for advancing Pierre's work.4 8
This is not to suggest that clinical experience will inevitably generate Pierre's critique or his posture toward law. Clinical education offers
only a methodology, but the contextualism and empiricism immanent in
the enterprise lend themselves to multiple interpretations of numberless
details.49 A postmodern legal thinker guiding the clinic's intellectual
inquiry may foreground certain questions that might otherwise be
framed differently or avoided entirely in the law school curriculumquestions like, "What would happen if we laid down the law?" The
point is not that the clinic will inexorably generate some set of correct
answers to this question, but that the clinic's critical epistemology might
possibly function as a counterpedagogy in the law school environment.
My suggestion here is that a clinic may be a law school setting in
which sober reckoning with law's identity, meaning, and actions is realistically possible.5" This contradicts Pierre's assertion that it is impossible to do law without participating in law's illusions, 5 ' without taking up
its metaphysics.5" Conversely, my contention is that it may be possible
to take up law consciously, strategically, even skeptically, and examine
its workings in the process. At least at the outset, using it does not
46. See Hiding the Ball, supra note 11, at 1683-87. Pierre questions not only why the ball is
hidden but whether a ball exists. Id. at 1695-1704.
47. See, e.g., David Luban, Epistemology and Moral Education, 33 J. LEcAL EDuc. 636
(1983) (suggesting that law students learn from internalizing habits at the point that they first
encounter professional responsibilities).
48. See generally Paul, supra note 6.
49. See ClinicalPerspective, supra note 18, at 746 ("[From a clinical perspective,] a deficient
analysis is one derived in the absence of careful empiricism and devoid of the data from which
alternative interpretive accounts might be constructed.").
50. As Pierre acknowledges: "[Law practice] is in some senses a more resonant and richer
source of intellectual inquiry about law than many of the genteel productions of normative legal
thought." Normativity, supra note 15, at 868.
51. See ENCHANTMENT, supra note 3, at 106 ("It is not possible to have or to do law . . .
without engaging in such illusions [e.g., that law has an objective, stable identity]. It is precisely
these illusions ... that make law ... possible.").
52. Schlag identifies the metaphysics of American law as the ascription of an objectivist and
subjectivist aesthetic to legal artifacts. In other words, laws and cases are perceived as having
stable, object-like identities and subjective powers to constrain, require, compel, and so forth. See
ENCHANTMENT, supra note 3, at 97-108.
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require believing in it.53 Daria Roithmayr's sophisticated elaboration of
a radical pragmatist's posture toward law illuminates this approach. 54

III.

POSTMODERN AND SOMEWHERE TO

Go

A clinic can give a critic a place to stand in a law school's
pedagogy.5 It involves standing with a person in need, one whose need
may be created by the intersection of the legal system with the structures
of poverty, race, and other caste systems in our culture. 56 The critical
thinking that can emerge from the clinical process-from the dynamic
interaction between professor, student, client, and other actors in the
legal bureaucracy-has an embodied existence that can be more meaningful than the politically correct pose that Pierre mocks in The Enchantment of Reason: "I speak here as a Harvard-educated white male. 5 7
Pierre's point, that this gesture does not genuinely grapple with its sub53. Schlag calls this "as-if' jurisprudence and observes that it is "parasitic on the metaphysics
that it denies." ENCHANTMENT, supra note 3, at 114. Consequently, he is unpersuaded that law
can be understood in this way: "[Flor those engaged in 'doing law,' how could they not believe in
the metaphysics at least some of the time? ...It would be a strange mind that could play such a
role effectively while also remembering that it is just a role." Id. at 108-12.
Other thinkers feel more sanguine about using law agnostically and instrumentally. See, e.g.,
Daria Roithmayr, A Defense of Radical Pragmatism, 57 U. MIAMI L. REv. 939 (2003).
54. See Roithmayr, supra note 53, at 947-53.
55. See ENCHANTMENT, supra note 3, at 126 ("[Lawyers] have been taught to think formally,
think universally, think neutrally, think impersonally. They have been trained to empty
themselves of bias, passion, commitments. The ideal, which is never quite reached, is to achieve
the view from nowhere."). To the contrary, to represent a client in a clinic is to adopt a view from
somewhere, often with a sense of commitment, passion, and acknowledged bias on behalf of one's
client.
56. In the L.A. Law drama, when attorney Stuart Markowitz says he is "lucky" to have his
driving while intoxicated charge dismissed, Pierre calls this
an extraordinary moment of self-deception. Indeed, it hardly classifies as luck for
an upper-middle class, well-connected, white male lawyer to be able to beat an
isolated DWI rap. On the contrary, it's part and parcel of what it means to be part of
that class. But Stuart . . .denies to himself that he is part of this web of social
power, and avoids any reckoning with the social sources of his power....
Normativity, supra note 15, at 858.
Likewise, inability to "beat a rap" is part and parcel of what it means to belong to an
unprivileged caste, and the students who represent such clients in a clinic often learn this lesson
vividly.
57. For example:
[Tihe first time someone announced in a formal scholarly work or presentation, "I
am speaking here as a Harvard-educated white male," the statement was probably
thought-provoking-effectively directing the audience's attention to the relations
between social identity of the author and his work. The audience might have paused
to think about the significance of whiteness or Harvardness as an aspect of context.
But through repetition, this act of critical reflexivity, this act of foregrounding, is
ultimately retired back into the context. The self-identification becomes little more
than the tired ritual of a familiar and boring political code.
ENCHANTMENT, supra note 3, at 75.
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ject position, is well-taken, but the upshot of this observation should not
be that reflexivity accomplishes so little that it is to be avoided. 8
It is easier to grapple with one's subject position when one's reflections are grounded in material contexts and emerge in relation to particular others whose respective relationships

to law's consequences

highlight one's own positioning. A clinic is but one location for such
critical reflection, but it may be an especially useful one for developing
critical self-consciousness and for examining law's differential material
consequences for people who are located in various social positions. 59
While I hesitate to recommend a legal clinic to someone as relentlessly
unprogrammatic as Pierre,6" I do consider it a potentially valuable vantage point within the law school for developing and teaching critique. I
58. The missing reflexivity of The Enchantment of Reason may be one of the sources of the
race-and-gender-based critique that emerged at the February symposium. This absence of
reflexivity suggests that Pierre did not consider his own subject position relative to the ideas in the
book sufficiently interesting to explore. At least in that sense, his work resembles the scholarship
it is critiquing.
White feminists and theorists of color are particularly inclined to explain experientially how
they have come to a perspective that diverges from a dominant paradigm. This seems a
requirement of intelligibility for those whose experiences may not be widely shared and
consequently are often excluded. See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding
the Theories, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 191 (1990); Richard Delgado, Storytelling for
Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989); Angela P. Harris,
Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990); BELLE HOOKS,
FEMINIST THEORY FROM MARGIN TO CENTER (1984); Patricia J. Williams, On Being the Object of
Property, 14 SIGNS 5 (1998).
The theoretical basis for this reflexivity has been elaborated in feminist standpoint literature.
See, e.g., Patricia Collins, Learning from the Outsider Within: The Sociological Significance of
Black Feminist Thought, 3 Soc. PROBS. 514 (1986); Donna Haraway, Situated Knowledges: The
Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective, 14 FEMINIST STUD. 575
(1988).
Since Pierre's understanding of enchantment, and his non-consequentialist approach to
working with it, may be integrally related to his subject position, the race and gender critique may,
in part, derive from a sense that the absence of reflexivity is an unacknowledged attribute of
privilege. For different reasons Duncan Kennedy urges Pierre to make a greater effort to
contextualize and historicize his writing. See Duncan Kennedy, Pierre Schlag's The Enchantment

of Reason, 57

MIAMI

L.
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513 (2003).

59. See, e.g., A Theory-Practice Spiral, supra note 18, at 1672-77 ("No one concerned with
the power allocations in legal process can avoid such critical institutional assessment ...
[C]linicians are deeply concerned with the conditions that trigger legal process, with the
consequences of legal process for their clients, and with the effect of legal process on all who
encounter it.").
60. Perhaps the best example of Pierre's resistance to programmatic thought comes at the
conclusion of Laying Down the Law:
Some legal thinkers are rendered quite anxious in the present moment. "What
comes next?" they want to know. "What will be next?" they wonder. "What
admirable vision of law will next capture the legal imagination?"
Maybe nothing. Maybe what comes next is that we stop treating "law" as
something to celebrate, expand, and worship. Maybe, we learn to lay down the law.
LAYING DOWN THE LAW, supra note 3, at 166.
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think it fits well with Jack Schlegel's suggestion that law professors
could go the honest route of empirical social inquiry about structures of
law practice, and that doing so "would complicate our understanding of
law enough to make it really interesting in human terms to our communities and our students."'"
While I think this may be a plausible description of a critical legal
clinic, I am aware that the possibility I envision occurs infrequently and
in few law school clinics. This alone might suggest that I am chasing a
fantasy. Or maybe it is just that as yet there is little overlap between
postmodern legal thinkers and law school clinicians.
Why is that? Because despite my recommendations, it would be
crazy for a postmodern legal thinker to choose the "unserenity" of a
clinical law professor's life.6 2 Marginalized though postmodern legal
thinkers are, at least they lead a typical law professor's life which is
organized to promote the production of scholarship, the real coin of the
university realm.6 3 While their views may be ignored or dismissed, at
least postmodern legal thinkers obtain a certain amount of institutional
prestige, respect, and reward from the rate and placement of their posttenure publications. Consciously disengaging from this set of institutional power relations to participate with students in the chaotic drama
of law practice for purposes of developing a legal counterpedagogy for
understanding law and its consequences is in many respects foolhardy.64
Practically speaking, this may make the Pierre Schlag Postmodern Legal
Clinic unachievable, but not because it is unintelligible.
What would make it unintelligible is if the acculturation of law
students into the dominant paradigm, the "Noble Scam," was so effective that by the time they reached the clinic, students had so internalized
law's unthought, and so needed to continue to accept law's unthought,
61. Schlegel, supra note 6, at 969.
62. "Unserenity" is Jerome Frank's word for the atmosphere of trials. See Jerome Frank,
Legal Thinking in Three Dimensions, I SYRACUSE L. REV. 9, 23 (1949). See also Jerome Frank,
Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 907, 908 (1933) (describing "[t]he
rough-and-tumble activities of the average lawyer's life").
63. Pierre recognizes that bringing the legal clinic into the classroom "would be [for the
classroom professor] to surrender professional and political benefits already secured ....
Normativity, supra note 15, at 927.
64. Bringing the clinic into the classroom would also require of traditional legal faculty:
[E]xtensive revision of the classroom script (a lot of hard work) and increased
intellectual risk as legal "knowledge" would be subject to the vagaries,
complications, and uncertainties of actual practice (a lot of ego risk). On the
political level, to allow the clinic into the classroom would mean that the traditional
faculty would immediately have to surrender the pleasant political fantasy that they
are helping prepare lawyers for an always already noble and admirable enterprise.
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that they resisted and rejected any fundamentally critical insights about
law. This observation may be largely true.65 While acculturation poses
a formidable obstacle to counterpedagogic efforts in general, perhaps it
too can be conceived as a pedagogic issue rather than an insurmountable
problem. I began to consider what a pedagogic process for moving
through resistance might look like when I was wrestling with this question: What would it take for Pierre's account of law to be openly
engaged in law schools rather than vilified or ignored?
IV.

DISSOLVING RESISTANCE, ENABLING CRITIQUE

I think an answer to this general question, like an answer to the
more specific question of how to overcome clinic students' resistance to
critical insights, may lie in pursuing Peter Goodrich's point that Pierre's
66 If
critique confronts the legal academy with desires it cannot name.
that is true, then resistance is expected and any possibility of overcoming it depends on acknowledging those suppressed desires. Where this
insight leads me is to thinking about the process of dissolving resistance
as one of developing and managing a process of grieving. 6 Teachers in
other disciplines, notably the humanities, have drawn on Lacan to suggest that teaching is a process of working through the fear and the grief
unleashed by detachment from the comfortable ideas that we so desire to
keep.68 Since identity is structured defensively, it does not magically
change by learning new concepts and ideas.69
Learning that involves changing values is accompanied by a sense
of loss. Giving up a deeply held belief is like letting go of a relationship
that has ended or a beloved person who has died, each of which was
internally constructed as a dense network of images, emotions, and sig65. Pierre believes that it is impossible to escape law's metaphysics. See supra notes 51-52
and accompanying text. Nevertheless, as The Enchantment of Reason itself reveals, it is possible,
albeit psychologically and socially costly, to get some purchase on the ways of law's
enchantment.
66. See Goodrich, supra note 2, at 794.
67. My unexpected turn to the subject of grief provoked considerable discussion and
disagreement at the February symposium. Some of the discussion centered on whether we at the
symposium were grieving and what it was we were grieving. While an engaging conversation,
this was not, to my mind, central to my point. I was raising the possibility of griefwork as a
pedagogy to help students address their feelings of loss when faith in law's nobility and
perfectability was shattered by engagement with critiques like Pierre's. I thought perhaps lessons
learned from griefwork might enable such engagement. Presumably, we at the symposium were
already engaging Pierre's work without significant distress and therefore were not likely to benefit
from the same sort of griefwork that I was suggesting as part of a pedagogy for those who were
inclined to reject critiques like his more reflexively.
68. See, e.g., Marshall W. Alcom, Jr., Ideological Death and Grief in the Classroom:
Mourning as a Prerequisiteto Learning, 6 J. PSYCHOANALYSIS CULTURE & SOC'Y 172 (2001).
69. Id. at 173, 175-76.
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nifiers.7° Grief is arduous because it requires significant adjustments in
our internal life, which include retracing the vast number of images,
feelings, and beliefs associated with the idea, then withdrawing our
us
attachment to each of them."' Grieving is painful because it requires
72
identity.
our
of
pieces
abandoning
of
feeling
to experience the
So too can openness to a powerful critique of beliefs long and
tightly held engender real distress, the kind of distress that, when unacknowledged, can produce some of the condemnatory reviews that
Pierre's work has at times received. 73 The distress comes from the work
of withdrawing our attachment to the internalized network of images,
sensations, words, and concepts that constitute part of our experience of
ourselves.7 ' No wonder people resist, avoiding such wounds and experiencing prolonged periods of anxiety at the glimpse of such a prospect.
This is one way to think about the dynamic of simultaneous attraction
and repulsion that Peter Goodrich identified in the reviews authored by
some of Pierre's harshest evaluators.7 5
We construct ourselves and our world of desires so that letting go

of our desires is an extraordinary anguish. In recognition of this psychological process, I want to conclude with the suggestion that we turn to
the psychoanalytic literature of working with grief to learn how to better
work with the fear of loss that may well underlie resistance to critique.7 6
Whether used in conjunction with a clinic or outside of it, understanding
the psychodynamics of mourning may help us devise better methods for
becoming more effective critical teachers and scholars.

70. Id. at 175.
71. Id.at 177.
72. Id. at 175. See also

JEFFREY BERMAN, DIARIES TO AN ENGLISH PROFESSOR: PAIN AND

GROWTH IN THE CLASSROOM (1994).

73. See, e.g., Brian Leiter, Heidegger and the Theory of Adjudication, 106 YALE L.J. 253
(1996); Brian Leiter, Objectivity and the Problems of Jurisprudence, 72 TEX. L. REV. 187 (1993).
74. See, e.g., Alcorn, supra note 68, at 175 ("Mourning is a situation in which one must
respond to the loss of a key component of one's identity."). Maybe this is another way of
understanding Duncan Kennedy's observation that given Pierre's analysis, "it would be
astounding if anyone paid any attention to him." Kennedy, supra note 58, at 514.
75. Peter Goodrich cites to negative commentary on Pierre's work by Brian Leiter, Neil
Duxbury, Matthew Kramer, Guyora Binder, Robert Weisberg, Douglas Litowitz, Francis Jay
Mootz, and David Carlson. See Goodrich, supra note 2, at 799-806.
76. Buddhist writer Joanna Macy recommends a process that she calls "despair work" as a
way of exploring our feelings of distress. JOANNA MACY, WORLD AS LOVER, WORLD AS SELF
(1991). 1 learned about Joanna Macy's book from my colleague Catharine Wells. See Catharine
Pierce Wells, The Perils of Race and Gender in a World of Legal Abstraction, 34 U.S.F. L. REV.
523, 533-35 (2000) (applying despair work as a method of healing from hurtful race and gender
dynamics).

